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Abstract
A true lie1 is a lie that becomes true when announced. In a logic of announce-
ments, where the announcing agent is not modelled, a true lie is a formula (that is false
and) that becomes true when announced. We investigate true lies and other types
of interaction between announced formulas, their preconditions and their postcon-
ditions, in the setting Gerbrandy’s logic of believed announcements, wherein agents
may have or obtain incorrect beliefs. Our results are on the satisfiability and validity
of instantiations of these semantically defined categories, on iterated announcements,
including arbitrarily often iterated announcements, and on syntactic characterization.
We close with results for iterated announcements in the logic of knowledge (instead
of belief), and for lying as private announcements (instead of public announcements)
to different agents. Detailed examples illustrate our lying concepts.
1 Introduction
Pang Juan was an ancient Chinese military general of the Wei state during
the Warring States period. Both he and Sun Bin studied under the tutelage of
the hermit Guiguzi, but later led the opposing armies of two countries (resp.)
Wei and Qi at war. Ambushed by Qi, the Wei army suffered a crushing defeat
and Pang Juan committed suicide. In traditional folklore, Sun Bin carved the
words “Pang Juan dies under this tree” on a tree at the ambush area. When
Pang and his men arrived, he saw that there were carvings on the tree so he
lit a torch for a closer look. At that moment, the Qi troops lying in ambush
attacked and Pang Juan committed suicide under that very tree.
(Based on https: // en. wikipedia. org/ wiki/ Pang_ Juan )
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The Pang Juan example demonstrates that the announcement of something false may
make it true. (A detailed analysis will be given later.) This is reminiscent of the logic of
truthful public announcements, wherein the announcement of something true may make
it false. The archetypical example is the announcement of p ∧ ¬✷p, for example when
you are being told: “You do not know that Pang Juan died in 342 BC.” To get p ∧ ¬✷p
we have to read this sentence as its implicature “Pang Juan died in 342 BC and you do
not know that.” This phenomenon may even be called the reason that this logic exists,
that it is considered interesting, and various puzzles build upon the phenomenon. But in
truthful public announcement logic we cannot announce something false thus making it
true. The announced formulas are supposed to be true. In an alternative semantics for
public announcement logic, that of conscious update (Gerbrandy and Groeneveld, 1997),
and that is also known as believed (public) announcement logic, the announcement of a
formula is independent of its truth. In that logic, we can call an announcement a lie if the
announced formula is false. A true lie is then the announcement of something false that
makes it true.
This analysis of a lie is not entirely according to the traditional view of agents lying
to each other: you are lying to me if you believe ¬ϕ but you say to me that ϕ with the
intention to make me believe that ϕ.2 If we model the realization of this intention (namely
that indeed I believe you), and incorporate all belief aspects, we get ✷a¬ϕ→ [✷aϕ]✷b✷aϕ
(where agent a lies to agent b). Abstracting from all belief aspects gives us ¬ϕ → [ϕ]ϕ.
Although the former is more precise, it is not uncommon, if not customary, to abstract
from the source and the justification of the lie so that we get ¬ϕ → [ϕ]✷bϕ, from where
it is not a big step to ¬ϕ → [ϕ]ϕ, the main focus of our investigation. (In order to make
this identification, we can think of agent b as the special agent who is able to distinguish
all states, for whom it holds that ✷bϕ ↔ ϕ.) This simplied schema ¬ϕ → [ϕ]ϕ is clearly
in opposition to the schema ϕ → [ϕ]ϕ for the so-called successful formulas. (In truthful
public announcement logic the successful formulas are those for which [ϕ]ϕ is valid. In
that logic [ϕ]ϕ is equivalent to ϕ → [ϕ]ϕ. But in believed public announcement logic,
where announcements are independent of the truth of the announced formula, [ϕ]ϕ is
not equivalent to ϕ → [ϕ]ϕ.) In this work we mainly investigate true lies, successful
formulas, and yet other notions in believed announcement logic, and also the iteration of
such announcements.
We also present results in this work that are not for believed announcement logic, but
that are still related to iterated announcements, or to lying.
In the logic of believed public announcements, interpreted on KD45 models encoding
belief, the announced formula can be false and true before the announcement and can also
be false and true after the announcement; and even beyond that, when iterating that same
announcement, this value can change in arbitrary ways after each next announcement. In
2This analysis of lying goes back to Augustine (1988). Lying has been a thriving topic in the philosophi-
cal community since then (Siegler, 1966; Bok, 1978; Mahon, 2006, 2008). More recent modal logical analyses
that can be seen as a continuation of this philosophical tradition include Baltag (2002); Steiner (2006);
Kooi and Renne (2011); van Ditmarsch et al. (2012); Sakama (2011); Liu and Wang (2013); van Ditmarsch
(2014). In modal logics with only belief operators the intentional aspect of lying is not modelled.
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the logic of truthful public announcements, interpreted on S5 models encoding knowledge,
lying is not possible. But it can still be that formulas other than the announcement keep
changing their value when iterating a given announcement, in ways otherwise very similar
to the results for belief.
In the Pang Juan example (as we will explain later) it can be argued that the action
involved is not so much an announcement but an assignment. Assignments model that
propositional variables change their value (it is also known as ontic change): the proposition
“Pang Juan dies under this tree” was false, and afterwards it is true: factual change. We
present a scenario involving lying wherein private (i.e., non-public) announcements and
private assignments both play a role: two friends hesitating to go to a party are both being
lied to that the other one is going to the party, subsequent to which they both change their
minds (factual change) and go to the party.
We now give an overview of our results and of the contents of our paper. Section 2
recalls the logic of believed announcements, and the subsequent Section 3 introduces all
novel terminology to put our results in perspective, and also gives an overview of our re-
sults. These results are then developped in detail in the remaining sections. In Section 4
we present results on successful formulas, true lies, self-refuting formulas, and (so-called)
impossible lies (that remain false even after announcement). In Section 5 we elaborate
on the result that there are models and announcements such that by iterating that an-
nouncement in the model we can change its value arbitrarily often and in arbitrarily chosen
ways. In Section 6 we syntactically characterize the single-agent true lies, i.e., formulas
that satisfy ¬ϕ→ [ϕ]ϕ. In Section 7 we discuss iteration of truthful public announcements
on models encoding knowledge, and in Section 8 the interaction of private announcements
and private assignments, by way of the above-mentioned example of two friends going to
party. Section 9 presents an integration of our different results in view of future research.
2 Logic of believed announcements
We recall the modelling of lying and truthtelling (after (van Ditmarsch et al., 2012)) in
believed (public) announcement logic, also known as ‘arrow elimination’ (not necessarily
truthful) public announcement logic (Gerbrandy and Groeneveld, 1997), which is a lesser
known alternative for the better known ‘state elimination’ (truthful) public announcement
logic (Plaza, 1989; Baltag et al., 1998). Its language, structures, and semantics are as
follows. Given are a finite set of agents A and a countable set of propositional variables P
(let a ∈ A and p ∈ P ).
Definition 1 (Language)
L ∋ ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | ✷aϕ | [ϕ]ϕ ⊣
Other propositional connectives are defined by abbreviation. For ✷aϕ, read ‘agent a be-
lieves formula ϕ’. If there is a single agent only, we may omit the index and write ✷ϕ
instead. Agent variables are a, b, c, . . . . For [ϕ]ψ, read ‘after public announcement of ϕ,
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ψ’. If ✷a¬ϕ, we say that ϕ is unbelievable (for a) and, consequently, if ¬✷a¬ϕ, for which
we write ✸aϕ, we say that ϕ is believable (for a). This is also read as ‘agent a considers it
possible that ϕ’. Shared belief ✷Aϕ (everybody believes that ϕ) is defined as
∧
a∈A✷aϕ.
We say that ϕ is believable iff all agents consider ϕ believable, i.e.,
∧
a∈A✸aϕ, for which
we write ✸Aϕ (however, this is not the dual of ✷Aϕ: we may have that ¬✷A¬ϕ but not
✸Aϕ). Believability plays an important role in our setting.
Definition 2 (Structures) An epistemic model M = (S,R, V ) consists of a domain S
of states (or ‘worlds’), an accessibility function R : A → P(S × S), where each R(a), for
which we write Ra, is an accessibility relation, and a valuation V : P → P(S), where each
V (p) represents the set of states where p is true. For s ∈ S, (M, s) is an epistemic state.⊣
An epistemic state is also known as a pointed Kripke model. We often omit the parentheses
in (M, s). Without any restrictions we call the model class K. The class of models where all
accessibility relations are transitive and euclidean is called K45, and if they are also serial
it is called KD45 (this class is the main focus of our investigations, because it encodes
agents with consistent beliefs). The class of models where all accessibility relations are
equivalence relations is S5. Class KD45 is said to have the properties of belief, and S5 to
have the properties of knowledge.
Definition 3 (Semantics) Assume an epistemic model M = (S,R, V ).
M, s |= p iff s ∈ Vp
M, s |= ¬ϕ iff M, s 6|= ϕ
M, s |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, s |= ϕ and M, s |= ψ
M, s |= ✷aϕ iff for all t ∈ S : Ra(s, t) implies M, t |= ϕ
M, s |= [ϕ]ψ iff M |ϕ, s |= ψ
where epistemic model M |ϕ = (S,Rϕ, V ) is as M except that for all a ∈ A, Rϕa :=
Ra ∩ (S × [[ϕ]]M ) (and where [[ϕ]]M := {s ∈ S |M, s |= ϕ}). ⊣
In our semantics, [ϕ]✷aψ means that, regardless of the truth of ϕ, agent a believes ψ
after public announcement of ϕ. In particular, [p]✷ap is valid: after the announcement of
a propositional variable, the agent believes that it is true; regardless of the value of that
variable. This is why it is called believed (public) announcement of ϕ, in contrast to the
truthful (public) announcement of ϕ (Plaza, 1989), wherein we restrict the model to the
subdomain of all states where ϕ is true (see Appendix A). As said, believed announcement
logic originates with Gerbrandy and Groeneveld (1997), where it is called the logic of
conscious updates. In believed announcement logic new information is accepted by the
agents independent from the truth of that information. In truthful announcement logic
new information is only incorporated if it is true.
It should be noted that in believed announcement logic announcements can be truthful
(namely when true) and lying (namely when false), whereas in truthful announcement logic
announcements can only be truthful. In van Ditmarsch et al. (2012) the believed public
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announcement of ϕ is modelled as non-deterministic choice between such truthful and lying
public announcement of ϕ, so that ‘after truthful announcement of ϕ, ψ’ corresponds to
ϕ→ [ϕ]ψ, and ‘after lying announcement of ϕ, ψ’ (after the lie that ϕ, ψ) corresponds to
¬ϕ→ [ϕ]ψ.
The announcing agent is not modelled in announcement logics, but only the effect of its
announcements on the audience, the set of all agents. The interaction between announce-
ment and belief can be formalized as [ϕ]✷aψ ↔ ✷a(ϕ→ [ϕ]ψ) (Gerbrandy and Groeneveld,
1997).
Believed and truthful announcement are therefore closely related. And even in a techni-
cal sense: whenever a believed announcement is true, the semantics delivers results that are
indistinguishable in the logics. This is because on any epistemic model, the model restric-
tion semantics and the arrow restriction semantics result in bisimilar models, on the part
of the model wherein the announcement is true. Investigations of these correspondences
are made in Kooi (2007) and van Ditmarsch et al. (2012).
3 Iteration of lying and truthful announcements
3.1 What is a true lie?
Let p be the proposition ‘Pang Juan dies under this tree’ (Chinese does not have a future
tense). As a consequence of Pang Juan observing ‘Pang Juan dies under this tree’, he
dies under this tree. The logic of public announcements is a logic of public observations,
and observing written text is the typical action that has a straightforward formalization in
logic: it corresponds to the announcement of the proposition representing that text. We
could imagine Pang Juan being uncertain if he would die under this tree (¬✷p ∧ ¬✷¬p),
such that observing p removes this uncertainty.
Still, this analysis is unsatisfactory: If the written text had been ‘Pang Juan does not
die under this tree’, i.e., ¬p, he would still have died. If the written text had been ‘The moon
is made of green cheese’, i.e., the announcement of some unrelated proposition q, he would
still have died. Even if there had nothing been written on that tree (it wasn’t carvings,
but merely a gnarled old tree trunk), i.e., the announcement of the trivial proposition ⊤,
he would still have died. It was giving away his position by lighting the torch that caused
his death, irrespective of what was written on the tree. Therefore the scenario cannot be
modelled as initial uncertainty that is reduced by an informative action: it does not fit the
schema ¬ϕ→ [ϕ]ϕ.
Alternatively, with some justification it can be said that p is false before the observation
of p but after the observation of p, p is true. Changing the value of a variable is factual/ontic
change. It could then be a lying public announcement of p (observing p while p is false)
linked to a public assignment changing the value of p into true. However, this analysis
has the same shortcomings as the previous one: what is observed does not matter. Also,
Pang Juan can hardly be seen as enacting his own death. The actors are the soldiers of
his enemy Sun Bin. Of course we can see the visual observation (informative) and the
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subsequent death (ontic) as two distinct, but related, actions.
Indeed van Emde Boas and van Emde Boas Lubsen (2016) argue that this action is
neither epistemic (informative) nor performative (factual).
In the True Lies movie Jamie Lee Curtis (unsuccessfully) plays the role of a timid
slovenly housewife, who starts enacting the lie that she is a spy in order to make her husband
jealous and thus seduce him. As Arnold Schwarzenegger really is a spy, because of her
enactment she also really becomes a spy (and incidentally also a sparkling, extrovert, and
well-dressed woman, a role that fits her rather well). This story of gradual and (exclusively)
factual change also does not fit a logic of exclusively informational change. However, this
factual changes interacts with belief (informative) change.
In Section 8 we will see that the combination of (private) informational and (private)
factual change after all makes for a pretty good but different kind of true lie. With
that background we will, in Section 9, review once more the Pang Juan and the Arnold
Schwarzenegger examples. In the current section (and the subsequent three sections, al-
together the core of our contribution) we focus exclusively on true lies as informational
change, i.e., ϕ is a true lie iff ¬ϕ → [ϕ]ϕ is valid in the logic of believed announcements.
Also relevant is the satisfiability of ¬ϕ ∧ [ϕ]ϕ. These different perspectives are, of course,
related, and we will now proceed to explain how. (In Section 3.2 they are properly defined
as special cases of a more general setup.)
Consider the formula ϕ = p ∧ ✷p and the model M consisting of two states s and t
wherein a proposition p is false and true, respectively, and that are indistinguishable for
the agent. We then have that M, t |= ¬(p ∧ ✷p) whereas M |(p ∧ ✷p), t |= p ∧ ✷p so that
M, t |= ¬(p ∧ ✷p)→ [p ∧✷p](p ∧✷p).
Therefore, the formula p ∧ ✷p is a true lie in state t of the model. On the other hand,
although M, s |= ¬(p ∧ ✷p), we have that M |(p ∧ ✷p), s 6|= p ∧ ✷p for the simple reason
that p is false in s. So
M, s 6|= ¬(p ∧✷p)→ [p ∧✷p](p ∧ ✷p).
We illustrate both transitions below:
¬p p
s t p∧✷p⇒
¬p p
s t
For another example, note that
M |(p ∧ ✷p), t |= ¬(p ∧ ✷p)→ [p ∧ ✷p](p ∧ ✷p)
for the simple reason that M |(p ∧ ✷p), t 6|= ¬(p ∧ ✷p). This seems somewhat undesirable:
you do not want the implication to be true because the antecedent is false. In a given
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model (N, u) you only want to call ϕ a true lie if N, u |= ¬ϕ but N, u |= [ϕ]ϕ, in other
words, if N, u |= ¬ϕ ∧ [ϕ]ϕ.
The formula p ∧ ✷p is sometimes a true lie and sometimes not. Of additional interest
are the formulas that are always true lies, i.e., formulas ϕ such that ¬ϕ → [ϕ]ϕ is valid.
Consider model class K45. We show that ✷p and p∨✷p are true lies. However, the latter
is more interesting than the former.
Let us first show that ✷p is a true lie. Consider an epistemic state (M, s), where
M = (S,R, V ), and such that M, s |= ¬✷p. Then there is a state t with (s, t) ∈ R and
such that M, t |= ¬p. Now consider the believed announcement update ✷p. Let u be
any state with (s, u) ∈ R. In a K45 model M |✷p with accessibility relation R✷p we have
that (s, u) 6∈ R✷p, because from (s, t) ∈ R and (s, u) ∈ R follows (euclidicity) (u, t) ∈ R
and thus M,u |= ¬✷p, so (s, u) 6∈ R✷p. In M |✷p no state is accessible from s. Thus,
M |✷p, s |= ✷p and therefore M, s |= ¬✷p→ [✷p]✷p.
If the ✷ modality represents belief, this is not a very interesting form of lying, as in
the resulting model the agent’s beliefs are inconsistent: M |✷p, s |= ✷p but also M |✷p, s |=
✷¬p. Differently said, as the agent did not believe ✷p, she does not consider it possible
that the lie ✷p is the truth. More interesting are what we will call the believable true
lies that we associate with the validity of (¬ϕ ∧✸ϕ)→ [ϕ]ϕ and with the satisfiability of
(¬ϕ∧✸ϕ)∧[ϕ]ϕ (and with the model class KD45 — believable true lies preserve consistent
beliefs). Formula ✷p is not believable in the last sense, as ¬✷p ∧✸✷p implies (in KD45)
that ¬✷p and ✷p are both true, which is inconsistent.
We now show that p ∨ ✷p is a true lie. Consider a K45 epistemic state (M, s), where
M = (S,R, V ), and such that M, s |= ¬p ∧ ¬✷p. Again, because M, s |= ¬p ∧ ¬✷p
and because M is a K45 model, none of the accessible states satisfy ✷p. But of course,
some may satisfy p. Therefore, M |(p ∨ ✷p), s |= ✷p and thus M |(p ∨ ✷p), s |= p ∨ ✷p.
Formula p∨✷p is therefore also a believable true lie, and even in the non-trivial sense that
¬(p ∨ ✷p) ∧✸(p ∨ ✷p) ∧ [p ∨ ✷p](p ∨ ✷p) is satisfiable (namely when there are accessible
p worlds as well from s in M). If p ∨✷p is believable, this lie will preserve seriality in the
updated model (as there must be an accessible p state), and therefore preserves KD45.
We illustrate the difference between these two true lies on the same model as above.
(We recall that p ∧ ✷p is not a true lie in both states of the model, but only in state t.)
¬p p
s t ✷p⇒
¬p p
s t
¬p p p∨✷p
⇒
¬p p
In this work we wish to investigate in depth which formulas may be true lies on a
given model, and which formulas may be true lies on any model, and for which classes of
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models. In addition to true lies that become true after lying announcements, there are the
successful formulas that remain true after truthful announcements, and we can consider two
other options: self-refuting formulas that become false after truthful announcements, and
what one might call ‘impossible lies’ that remain false after lying announcements. We will
therefore take a more general perspective: what formulas may change their value or keep
their value after their announcement, how does this depend on whether they were true or
false before the announcement, and what happens when we iterate these announcements?
We now first introduce terminology to address these matters.
3.2 Terminology for iterated announcements
Given σ ∈ {0, 1}∗ and k ≤ |σ|, σk denotes the kth digit of σ and σ|k the prefix consisting
of the first k elements of σ. We abuse notation and also view σk as a function σk : L → L
on formulas such that
σk(ϕ) =
{
ϕ if σk = 1
¬ϕ if σk = 0
Definition 4 Let X be a class of models and σ ∈ {0, 1}∗ with n = |σ| ≥ 2. Formula
ϕ ∈ L is σ-satisfiable in X iff σ1(ϕ) ∧ [ϕ]τ2(ϕ) is satisfiable in X , and ϕ is σ-valid in X
iff σ1(ϕ)→ [ϕ]τ2(ϕ) is valid in X , where:
τk(ϕ) =
{
σk(ϕ) ∧ [ϕ]τk+1(ϕ) 1 < k < n
σk(ϕ) k = n
Formula ϕ is non-trivially σ-valid iff it is σ-valid and σ-satisfiable.
For σ ∈ {0, 1}ω (i.e. σ : N+ → {0, 1}), ϕ ∈ L is σ-satisfiable in X iff there is a X
model (M, s) such that ϕ is σ|k-satisfiable in (M, s) for all k ∈ N (with k ≥ 2). Formula
ϕ ∈ L is σ-valid in X iff it is σ|k-valid for all k ∈ N (with k ≥ 2). ⊣
For example, if |σ| = 3 then ϕ is a σ-valid formula in K iff σ1(ϕ)→ [ϕ](σ2(ϕ) ∧ [ϕ]σ3(ϕ))
is valid in K; if σ = 001 we get |= ¬ϕ→ [ϕ](¬ϕ∧ [ϕ]ϕ) (in K). We typically only consider
model classes K and KD45.
We can alternatively describe σ-satisfiability as follows. For that, given a model M , a
formula ϕ ∈ L, and k ∈ N, we first define M |ϕ0 = M and M |ϕk+1 = (M |ϕk)|ϕ. Then,
ϕ ∈ L is σ-satisfiable in X iff there is a X model (M, s) such that for all 1 ≤ k ≤ |σ|,
M |ϕk−1, s |= σk(ϕ).
Definition 5 Formula ϕ ∈ L is believable σ-satisfiable in X iff σ1(ϕ)∧✸Aϕ∧ [ϕ]τ2(ϕ) is
satisfiable in X , and ϕ is believable σ-valid in X iff (σ1(ϕ) ∧✸Aϕ)→ [ϕ]τ2(ϕ) is valid in
X , where:
τk(ϕ) =
{
σk(ϕ) ∧✸Aϕ ∧ [ϕ]τk+1(ϕ) 1 < k < n
σk(ϕ) k = n
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Non-trivially believable σ-valid is believable σ-valid and believable σ-satisfiable, analogously
to above, in Def. 4. Believable σ-satisfiable and believable σ-valid for infinite strings are also
analogously defined as above. For the believable σ-satisfiable/valid formulas we typically
consider model class KD45.
If ϕ is σ-satisfiable then it may not be believable σ-satisfiable, as the latter implies the
former. If ϕ is σ-valid then it is also believable σ-valid, as the former implies the latter
(the condition in the implication is stronger). However, if ϕ is non-trivially σ-valid then it
may not be non-trivially believable σ-valid, and vice versa.
For strings σ of length 2 we use corresponding English terminology that reflects common
usage in the literature.
σ name σ-valid σ-satisfiable
10 self-refuting |= ϕ→ [ϕ]¬ϕ ∃(M, s) : (M, s) |= ϕ ∧ [ϕ]¬ϕ
01 true lie |= ¬ϕ→ [ϕ]ϕ ∃(M, s) : (M, s) |= ¬ϕ ∧ [ϕ]ϕ
11 successful |= ϕ→ [ϕ]ϕ ∃(M, s) : (M, s) |= ϕ ∧ [ϕ]ϕ
00 impossible lie |= ¬ϕ→ [ϕ]¬ϕ ∃(M, s) : (M, s) |= ¬ϕ ∧ [ϕ]¬ϕ
It is also common to refer to a formula that is 11-satisfiable in a given model (M, s)
as a successful update, and to a formula that is not, as an unsuccessful update, etc. The
successful formulas are the most well-known from the literature, and have been investigated
on the class of S5 models (van Ditmarsch and Kooi, 2006; Holliday and Icard, 2010). The
archetypical unsuccessful update and even self-refuting formula in that setting is p ∧ ¬✷p
(Moore, 1942; Hintikka, 1962; Holliday and Icard, 2010).
It is easy to come up with σ-satisfiable formulas for any finite string σ. But it is
even easier to see finite strings as prefixes of infinite strings, and to show that infinite σ
are always satisfiable. For infinite σ, in view of iterated relativization (Miller and Moss,
2005; Sadzik, 2006), formulas that can be announced arbitrarily often in a given model
without stabilizing to the value of the announcement formula or its negation have our
special attention. Such a formula we call unstable.
Definition 6 (Unstable) A σ ∈ {0, 1}ω is called unstable iff for all n ∈ N there are
m, k ≥ n such that σm = 1 and σk = 0. A formula ϕ ∈ L is an unstable formula iff it is
σ-satisfiable for an unstable σ. ⊣
In other words, a formula ϕ is unstable iff there is a (M, s) such that for all n ∈ N there
are m, k ≥ n such that M |ϕm, s |= ϕ and M |ϕk, s |= ¬ϕ. In the continuation we will see
that there are σ-satisfiable formulas for any σ ∈ {0, 1}ω (this includes the unstable σs),
whereas for σ-validity we only need to consider finite strings (this does not imply stability
in a particular model, but recurrence of a finite pattern).
3.3 Overview of results and conjectures
In this section we present results and conjectures for σ-satisfiable and σ-valid formulas,
with respect to the classes K and KD45. We wish to encourage the reader to obtain
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further results. We start with two rather obvious observations. Let σ be a finite or infinite
{0, 1} string:
• If ϕ is σ-satisfiable and τ is a prefix of σ, then ϕ is τ -satisfiable; and if ϕ is σ-valid
and τ is a prefix of σ, then ϕ is τ -valid.
• If ϕ is believable σ-satisfiable on class KD45 in (M, s), then for all m < |σ|, M |ϕm ∈
KD45.
We now start with results for σ-satisfiability and continue with results for σ-validity. Var-
ious results are accompanied by lengthy proofs and drawn-out examples which are found
in separate sections.
Proposition 7 Let σ ∈ {0, 1}ω. Then there are σ-satisfiable formulas on class K. ⊣
Proof See Section 5.1. We provide a single formula, namely ¬✷⊥ ∧ ((✸✷⊥∧✸¬✷⊥)→
✸(p∧✷⊥)), and a single frame F (a frame is a model without the valuation, i.e., a pair pair
(S,R)) with designated state s ∈ S such that for any σ ∈ {0, 1}ω, by properly choosing
the valuation V on F , we can establish that ¬✷⊥ ∧ ((✸✷⊥ ∧ ✸¬✷⊥) → ✸(p ∧ ✷⊥)) is
σ-satisfiable in ((F, V ), s). The root s is infinitely branching. 
Proposition 8 Let σ ∈ {0, 1}ω. Then there are believable σ-satisfiable formulas on class
KD45. ⊣
Proof See Section 5.3. The result is obtained by adapting the formula and model used
in Proposition 7. This is according to fairly standard method to transform a model with
a directed single-agent accessibility relation into a model with two undirected accessibility
relations for different agents. (The method has been used for multi-S5 models but not for
multi-KD45 models, to our knowledge.) 
We continue with results on σ-validity. Our special interest have non-trivial σ-valid
formulas and non-trivial believable σ-valid formulas. (We recall that ‘non-trivial’ means
that they are also σ-satisfiable.)
First, a negative and a positive result for single updates.
Proposition 9 There are no non-trivial 01-valid formulas on class K. ⊣
Proof If ϕ is a trivial 01-valid formula then ϕ is equivalent to ⊤. Let us therefore assume
that ¬ϕ is satisfiable.
Suppose towards contradiction that such a non-trivial true lie exists. Call it ϕ. Then
¬ϕ is satisfiable on a model. Without loss of generality suppose it is a tree, with the root
of the tree as the designated state.
Now consider a singleton model with an empty accessibility relation, i.e., a dead end.
Call it (M, s). If (M, s) satisfies ¬ϕ then ϕ cannot be a true lie, since the announcement
of ϕ does not change the model (the accessibility relation is already empty). Therefore
(M, s) satisfies ϕ.
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Now consider any model (N, t) such that t only has successors that are dead ends.
Using the above result for singletons we know that those successors also satisfy ϕ. Now if
(N, t) were to satisfy ¬ϕ, then ϕ is not a true lie since the announcement of ϕ would not
change the model either: all successors are ϕ states. Therefore (N, t) has to satisfy ϕ.
Continuing this reasoning, it will be clear that ϕ must be satisfied in all finite-depth
trees. Therefore, if a non-trivial true lie exists, it can only be satisfiable on an infinite-depth
tree.
Let (M, s) be an infinite-depth tree such that (M, s) satisfies ¬ϕ and [ϕ]ϕ. The for-
mula ¬ϕ ∧ [ϕ]ϕ is equivalent to an announcement-free formula ψ (the logic of believed
announcement is equally expressive as the base modal logic, via a rewriting system). Let
d be the modal depth of ψ.
For d′ > d, let (N, t) be a finite-depth tree that is d′-bisimilar to (M, s) (we refer to
Blackburn et al. (2001) for this notion). Then for all formulas η of modal depth at most
d′, (M, s) |= η iff (N, t) |= η. Therefore, as (M, s) |= ψ and the modal depth of ψ is d < d′,
also (N, t) |= ψ, i.e., (N, t) |= ¬ϕ ∧ [ϕ]ϕ. This contradicts that finite-depth trees cannot
satisfy true lies as already obtained above.
As neither finite-depth nor infinite-depth trees may satisfy ¬ϕ, no tree satisfies ¬ϕ and
thus no pointed model. Therefore non-trivial true lies do not exist on class K. 
Proposition 10 Let σ ∈ {0, 1}2. Then there are non-trivial σ-valid formulas and non-
trivial believable σ-valid formulas on class KD45. ⊣
Proof See Section 4. The section also gives references for the origin of the corresponding
English terminology, in the context of validity and satisfiability. 
We recall that a believable true lie is a believable 01-valid formula. The following result
is a syntactical characterization of this semantic notion, on the KD45 models. The term
‘disjunctive lying form’ is defined syntactically in Section 6.
Proposition 11 (Characterization of believable true lies) A formula is a believable
true lie iff it is not equivalent to a disjunctive lying form. ⊣
Proof See Section 6. The proof closely follows the proof of the syntactic characterization
of successful formulas in Holliday and Icard (2010). 
There are successful formulas that are not true lies, such as booleans. Clearly |= p→ [p]p,
whereas 6|= ¬p → [p]p. There are also successful formulas that are true lies, such as ¬✷p
and (in the universal fragment:) p ∨ ✷p. At some stage we conjectured that all true lies
are successful formulas. But this is not the case.
Proposition 12 (Some true lies are not successful formulas) On class K45 (KD45),
some 01-valid formulas are not 11-valid. ⊣
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Proof Let ϕ = ✷⊥∨ (p∧✸p∧✸¬p)∨ (¬p∧✸p∧✷p). We show that on K45 ϕ is 01-valid
but not 11-valid.
Due to transitivity and euclidicity, a pointed K45 model consists of a designated point
possibly pointing at a cluster of indistinguishable points. The formula ϕ actually specifies
its K45 models modulo bisimilarity. We list all eight K45 pointed models (modulo bisimi-
larity) for one variable p, where we distinguish those where ϕ is true from those where ϕ is
false, and we also give the result of the ϕ update. The underlined state is the designated
state.
— ϕ is true at these four models:
a : ¬p p b : ¬p p c : ¬p p d : ¬p p
— annoucing ϕ in those models delivers:
a′ : ¬p p b′ : ¬p p c′ : ¬p p d′ : ¬p p
— ϕ is false at these four models:
e : ¬p p f : ¬p p g : ¬p p h : ¬p p
— announcing ϕ in those models delivers:
e′ : ¬p p f ′ : ¬p p g′ : ¬p p h′ : ¬p p
Models e′, f ′, g′, h′ are bisimilar to a, b, d, a respectively, thus ¬ϕ→ [ϕ]ϕ holds on e, f, g, h,
i.e., ϕ is 01-valid. However, c′ is bisimilar to e thus ϕ→ [ϕ]ϕ is false at model c, i.e., ϕ is
not 11-valid.
We not only have that ϕ is 01-valid but not 11-valid on K45 but also that ϕ is 01-valid
(obvious) but not 11-valid (not obvious: the transition between c and c′ is between KD45
models) on KD45. The reader may further observe that ϕ is also non-trivially believable
01-valid (the transition from g to g′ is between KD45 models). 
A natural question to ask is whether for all σ ∈ {0, 1}∗ ∪ {0, 1}ω there are (non-trivial)
σ-valid formulas. The answer is (un)fortunately negative. For example, there are no
(non-trivial) 001-valid formulas. We recall that 001-valid means  ¬ϕ → [ϕ](¬ϕ ∧ [ϕ]ϕ).
Let (M, s) be such that M, s 2 ϕ. Then M,w  [ϕ](¬ϕ ∧ [ϕ]ϕ), i.e., M |ϕ, s  ¬ϕ and
M |ϕ, s |= [ϕ]ϕ. From the latter we get M |ϕ|ϕ, s |= ϕ. However, as ¬ϕ→ [ϕ](¬ϕ∧ [ϕ]ϕ) is
valid it also holds on (M |ϕ, s), so that M |ϕ, s |= ¬ϕ → [ϕ](¬ϕ ∧ [ϕ]ϕ), and in particular
M |ϕ, s |= ¬ϕ→ [ϕ]¬ϕ, so that, as M |ϕ, s |= ¬ϕ, we have M |ϕ|ϕ, s |= ¬ϕ . Contradiction.
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We already observed above that if σ is a prefix of τ and a formula is τ -valid then it
is also σ-valid. In the other direction this is very obviously false, for example there are
impossible lies (such as ¬✷p, i.e., 00-valid formulas). But we saw in the previous paragraph
that there are no 001-valid formulas. However, sometimes, if σ is a prefix of τ and a formula
is σ-valid, then it is also τ -valid.
Given σ ∈ {0, 1}ω and prefix τ of σ, then σ and τ (and τ and σ) are completion
equivalent iff for all intermediate strings τ ′ (for all prefixes τ ′ of σ such that τ is a prefix of
τ ′), a formula is σ-valid iff it is τ ′-valid. This relation is clearly an equivalence relation. The
shortest sequence of a completion equivalence class is the representative and the longest
(possibly infinite) sequence of this class is the completion.
Conjecture 13 The following completion equivalence classes of σ-valid formulas are all
non-empty and all different, and there are no other classes.
01k (k > 0) 10k (k > 0) 01k0 (k ≥ 0) 10k1 (k ≥ 0) ⊣
If σ = 01k0 (for k ≥ 0), then τ = 0(1k0)ω is its completion; and similarly if σ = 10k1
(for k ≥ 0), then τ = 1(0k1)ω is its completion. For example, the 11-valid formulas are
also 111-valid, or 1111-valid, or 111 . . . -valid: they are all completion equivalent; 111 . . .
is the completion of this class and 11 is its representative. On the other hand, σs of shape
01k and 10k (for k > 0) may have no infinite completions and be already maximal.
There are 011-validities on K45. A true lie p∨✷p is an example. We recall that a true
lie is by definition a 01-validity. But formula p∨✷p is also 011-valid, because if announced
when false, it results in a K45 model satisfying ✷p and such that further updates have
no informative effect. Therefore, it is also 0111-valid, and . . . and 01ω-valid. Similarly, a
believable true lie p ∨ ✷p is an example of a 011-validity on KD45. As it is believable,
this guarantees the existence of an accessible p state. That state will be preserved after
the p ∨ ✷p update, and thus the resulting model is serial. More interesting would be a
011-validity that is not a 0111-validity. For another example, from Proposition 9 follows
that there are no 01k-validities on class K. But we have not investigated systematically
which of the conjectured σ-valid types are non-empty and for which classes of models.
4 The cases 01, 11, 10, and 00
In this section we restrict ourselves to validities on class KD45 (or S5, included in KD45).
Successful formulas
|= ϕ→ [ϕ]ϕ
A successful update in some given model is a 11-satisfiable formula (in that model).
We then call a formula ‘successful’ if it is always a successful update, i.e., if it is not
merely 11-satisfiable but 11-valid. The typical example of a successful update is ‘no child
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steps forward’ in the muddy children problem (Moses et al., 1986; van Ditmarsch and Kooi,
2015). Given k muddy children out of n children, this is a succesful update for the first k−2
times that father makes his request to step forward if you know whether you are muddy,
and only an unsuccessful update the (k − 1)th time, as the kth time that the request is
made, the muddy children step forward. The formula in question, for the example of three
muddy children, is ¬(✷ama ∨✷a¬ma)∧¬(✷bmb ∨✷b¬mb)∧¬(✷cmc ∨✷c¬mc) (where mi
stands for “child i is muddy”). However, the archetypical unsuccessful update is p ∧ ¬✷p
(Moore, 1942; Hintikka, 1962). The original 1940s setting is the incoherence of a person
saying “I went to the pictures [movies] last Tuesday, but I don’t believe that I did” (Moore,
1942, p. 543). In fact, p ∧ ¬✷p is a self-refuting formula: after announcing it truthfully, it
always becomes false.
The successful formulas are the most well-known from the literature, and have been
investigated on the class of S5 models (van Ditmarsch and Kooi, 2006; Holliday and Icard,
2010). On the class S5, and using the (state eliminating) semantics of truthful public
announcement logic, the successful formulas are those for which |= [ϕ]ϕ (and the self-
refuting formulas are then those for which |= [ϕ]¬ϕ). On S5 (but of course not in KD45),
ϕ → [ϕ]ψ is equivalent to [ϕ]ψ. A formula is successful in believed announcement logic if
and only if it is successful in truthful announcement logic. This we can easily see:
In truthful announcement logic, M, s |= [ϕ]ϕ iff (M, s |= ϕ implies M |ϕ, s |= ϕ), where
M |ϕ denotes the submodel consisting of the states satisfying ϕ (see Appendix A); whereas
in believed announcement logic, M, s |= ϕ → [ϕ]ϕ iff (M, s |= ϕ implies M |ϕ, s |= ϕ).
Using that, whenever the announcement formula ϕ is true in a model (M, s), the model
(M |ϕ, s) resulting from state elimination is bisimilar to the model (M |ϕ, s) resulting from
arrow elimination.
A characterization of single-agent successful formulas in S5 is known (Holliday and Icard,
2010) (we will use it below to obtain results for true lies), but only incidental results
and no characterization is known for multi-agent successful formulas. Results are that:
the positive fragment is successful (van Ditmarsch and Kooi, 2006) (the positive or uni-
versal fragment of the language of public announcement logic is inductively defined by
ϕ ::= p | ¬p | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ✷aϕ | [¬ϕ]ϕ), publicly known formulas are successful (formu-
las ✷∗Aϕ, where ✷
∗
A stands for common knowledge for the set of all agents — however note
that ✷∗Bϕ may be unsuccessful if B ⊂ A), ¬✷ap is successful (and non-trivially believable)
(Qian, 2002) — an older result than Holliday and Icard (2010), but subsumed by the later
characterization of Holliday and Icard (2010).
A strong intuitive and technical motivation for the successful formulas in truthful an-
nouncement logic is that they describe the so-called substitution free fragment of the logic.
In general we do not have for dynamic epistemic logics that |= ϕ iff |= ϕ[p/ψ], for example
[p]p is valid but [p ∧ ¬✷p](p ∧ ¬✷p) is invalid. But this uniform substitution holds for the
fragment of the language consisting of the successful formulas (Holliday et al., 2013).
Self-refuting formulas
|= ϕ→ [ϕ]¬ϕ
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Similarly to the successful formulas, a formula is self-refuting in believed announce-
ment logic if and only if it is self-refuting in truthful announcement logic. As said, a
well-known self-refuting formula (and that is also non-trivially believable) is p ∧ ¬✷p.
A syntactic characterization of single-agent self-refuting formulas in S5 is also presented
in Holliday and Icard (2010), but a more general multi-agent characterization is also not
known to us (researchers have been looking for this in vain for some considerable time).
Impossible lies
|= ¬ϕ→ [ϕ]¬ϕ
Clearly ⊤ is an impossible lie, as this makes the antecedent ¬ϕ of the implication
false, but this is the trivial case. Slightly more interesting impossible lies are the booleans.
(And all these are non-trivially believable.) For example, p is an impossible lie because
|= ¬p→ [p]¬p. This is obvious, as announcements do not change the value of propositional
variables.
Another impossible lie is ¬✷p. It is trivial: |= ✷p → [¬✷p]✷p holds because in any
model satisfying ✷p the accessibility relation of the agent is empty after the ¬✷p update.
The formula ¬✷p is also a successful formula. No characterization results are known
for impossible lies.
True lies
|= ¬ϕ→ [ϕ]ϕ
Above we have already seen examples of true lies. The formula ⊤ (or any other valid
formula) is a trivial true lie. Examples of single-agent true lies are: ✷p, p ∨ ✷p (which is
non-trivially believable).
Unsatisfiable formulas are not true lies, as [⊥]⊥ is equivalent to ⊥ (in believed an-
nouncement logic, not in truthful announcement logic), so that ¬⊥ → ⊥ is equivalent to
⊥.
Section 6 proves a syntactical characterization of single-agent believable true lies in
class KD45 (Proposition 11).
5 An unstable formula
In this section we investigate some models and formulas where the iteration of the same
update never stabilizes and continues to transform the model, forever and ever. First comes
an example with a K model and a single agent, and an alternating 010101...-satisfiable
update (Section 5.1). Then comes another example generalizing this to arbitrary boolean
functions σ and σ-satisfiability (Section 5.2). Following that comes a multi-agent example
for KD45 agents (with consistent beliefs) (Section 5.3).
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5.1 Example of an unstable formula
We demonstrate that the formula ¬✷⊥ ∧ ((✸✷⊥ ∧✸¬✷⊥)→ ✸(p ∧✷⊥)) is unstable for
the model defined below and for the boolean function σ ∈ {0, 1}ω (i.e. σ : N+ → {0, 1})
such that σn = 1 for n even and σn = 0 for n odd.
Consider a modelM in Figure 1 on the left consisting of a root s with branches of length
n for each positive natural number n. We also consider a single propositional variable p
that is false in the leaves, and from there on towards the root alternatingly true and false.
We finally take the value of p in the root to be true, but in fact that does not matter. (In
the figure, nodes where p is true are denoted ◦ and nodes where p is false are denoted •.)
We now consider the update of (M, s) with the formula ϕ = ¬✷⊥∧((✸✷⊥∧✸¬✷⊥) →
✸(p ∧ ✷⊥)). The formula ϕ describes, in other words: “I am not a leaf node and if I am
the root (i.e., if I am the unique node that is branching) then there is a branch of length
1 wherein p is true in the leaf of that branch.”
We take the arrow elimination update, that is, arrows pointing to states where the
formula is false are deleted, and all other arrows are preserved. The result is the middle
structure in Figure 1. The underlying frames of that model and the left model in the figure
are isomorphic. This we can see by rotating the middle structure counterclockwise by 45
degrees and removing the isolated (unreachable) points. That result is pictured on the
right in the figure.
If we now update again with ϕ, the original model reappears (in the strong sense that
the root-generated submodel is bisimilar — this is the↔ notation — and even isomorphic):
M, s |= ¬ϕ
M |ϕ, s |= ϕ
M |ϕ|ϕ, s |= ¬ϕ such that (M |ϕ|ϕ, s)↔(M, s)
and in general we have in this case (we recall that M |ϕ0 =M and M |ϕn+1 = (M |ϕn)|ϕ)
M |ϕn, s |= ϕ for n ∈ N odd
M |ϕn, s |= ¬ϕ for n ∈ N even or n = 0
(M |ϕn, s)↔(M |ϕn+2, s) for all n ∈ N
5.2 Arbitrary boolean function
Let now any boolean function σ ∈ {0, 1}ω be given. Consider again the frame of the model
M of Subsection 5.1 and the same formula ϕ := ¬✷⊥ ∧ ((✸✷⊥∧✸¬✷⊥)→ ✸(p ∧✷⊥)).
The value in the root of the model is irrelevant. In that model, ◦ no longer means that p
is true. Instead, we decorate the model with values for atom p according to the string σ,
as below. This ensures that for all n ∈ N, M |ϕn, s |= σn+1(ϕ).
For an example, let be σ = 011100011 . . . . Then σ1 = 0 (the first digit), σ2 = 1, etc.
Therefore p is false at the leaf of the branch of length 1 (false means value 0), and in the
branch of length 2 p is true halfway (σ3) and again false at the leaf, and so on. For n = 0,
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◦•
◦
•
•
◦
•
◦
•
◦
•
¬ϕ
ϕ ϕ
ϕ
ϕ
ϕ
ϕ
ϕ!
⇒
◦•
◦
•
•
◦
•
◦
•
◦
•
ϕ
ϕ ϕ
ϕ
↔
◦◦
•
◦
◦
•
◦
•
◦
•
◦
ϕ
ϕ ϕ
ϕ
ϕ
ϕ
ϕ
Figure 1: Example unstable formula
we should get M |ϕ0, s |= σ1(ϕ). As M |ϕ
0 =M , and σ1(ϕ) = ¬ϕ, we get M, s |= ¬ϕ. And
this is indeed the case, because the subformula ✸(p∧✷⊥) of ϕ is false in the root, because
p is false (σ1 = 0) at the leaf of the branch of length 1.
Announcement of ϕ causes all leaves to be eliminated from the model, as before, with
the result that all leaves are now decorated with propositions p with value σ2 = 1. So we
should have M |ϕ, s |= ϕ, i.e., M |ϕ1, s |= σ2(ϕ). And so it is, because M |ϕ, s |= ✸(p∧✷⊥).
And so on.
◦◦
◦
◦
◦
◦
◦
◦
◦
◦
◦
σ1
σ2
σ1
σ3
σ2
σ1
σ4
σ3
σ2
σ1
ϕ
⇒
◦◦
◦
◦
◦
◦
◦
◦
◦
◦
◦
σ2
σ3
σ2
σ4
σ3
σ2
σ5
σ4
σ3
σ2
ϕ
⇒ . . .
This proves Proposition 7 that there are σ-satisfiable formulas on class K for any string σ.
5.3 An unstable formula for agents with consistent beliefs
A common way to transform a model for a directed single-agent (unimodal) setting ex-
hibiting a certain desirable property into a model for a symmetric multi-agent setting with
the same property, is to replace an arrow by a pair of (undirected) links for different agents,
i.e., a pair (x, y) ∈ R by two pairs (x, z) ∈ Ra and (z, y) ∈ Rb. In a multi-agent S5 setting,
this means chaining equivalence classes of size two for different agents a and b. Instead of
arbitrarily long finite chains, we then build arbitrarily long alternating and interlocking a/b
chains. The technique has been used to great effect for undecidability arguments for S5
logics (French and van Ditmarsch, 2008) and also to great effect for expressivity arguments
for such logics (van Ditmarsch et al., 2007; Kooi, 2007). This chaining procedure can be
extended in a natural way to KD45 models (for consistent belief), namely when (at least)
the root of the model is an unreachable state wherein incorrect belief is possible, but where
(almost) all remaining states constitute equivalence classes (wherein belief is correct). We
17
apply this procedure to get a symmetric multi-agent model from an asymmetric single-
agent model, to the model M of Subsection 5.1, in order to get an example of an unstable
formula in a multi-agent KD45 setting.
Starting with the model M of that section, we thus get the following model N . The
accessibility relation is solid for agent a and it is dashed for agent b. Intuitively, to get
N from M , all nodes are replaced by two nodes with the same valuation and that are
indistinguishable for an agent b, whereas one might say the previous directed arrows are
replaced by indistinguishability for an agent a. Except for the root, wherein we do some-
thing special: all pairs in the accessibility relation for a starting in the root are directed,
and we add another node to the model that is accessible from the root for agent b only (in
the figure: the node below the root), and from where all nodes accessible from the root
for agent a are also a-accessible (in the figure we have only drawn one of those arrows, for
visual clarity). This is a KD45 model. We assume the usual visual conventions for such
models: all directed arrows point to clusters of indistinguishable nodes for that agent (see
Appendix B). However, merely in order to emphasize the similarity with the model M ,
from the root of the model we have many outgoing arrows (whereas according to the visual
convention one would have been enough).
◦••
◦
◦
•
•
•
•
◦
◦
•
•
◦
◦
•
•
◦
◦
•
•
•
Instead of
ϕ = ¬✷⊥ ∧ ((✸✷⊥ ∧✸¬✷⊥)→ ✸(p ∧ ✷⊥))
we then get a more or less corresponding multi-agent formula
ψ = ¬✸b(✷ap ∨ ✷a¬p) ∧ ((p ∧✷b¬p)→ ✸a✸b✷ap)
To get the latter from the former, first replace each ✸ by ✸a✸b. We recall that in the
model, we replaced each directed unlabeled arrow by an a step plus a b step. Then, replace
✷⊥ by ✸b(✷ap∨✷a¬p). We recall that ✷⊥ defined a leaf node inM . As KD45 models are
serial, we now observe that the leaves of model N are the unique nodes wherein a knows
whether p: ✷ap ∨ ✷a¬p, such that ✸b(✷ap ∨ ✷a¬p) is only true in the final two nodes of
each branch.
18
The extra node is needed to allow for a formula that distinguishes the root node from
other nodes: the root of N is the unique node wherein agent b has incorrect belief: p∧✷b¬p.
In all other nodes, agent b (correctly) knows the value of p. (We did not know how to
distinguish the root node from other nodes without introducing such an additional node.)
The nodes a-accessible from the root form an infinite a-equivalence class. The a arrows
leading from the extra node below the root to that class are there so that this node is not
a leaf.
With the ‘translation’ so far, the final part ✸(p ∧ ✷⊥) of the formula ϕ becomes
✸a✸b(p∧✸b(✷ap∨✷a¬p)), which is KD45 equivalent to ✸a✸b✷ap, as found in the formula
ψ.
In plain English, ψ describes that: (i) b does not consider it possible that a knows
whether p, and that (ii) in the node where b’s belief is incorrect (the root note), a considers
it possible that b considers it possible for a to know that (not whether!) p. Condition (i)
is always false in the leaves and in the nodes just below the leaves, whereas condition (ii)
is only true in the root if there is a path of length 2 to a leaf node satisfying p. If we now
update model N with ψ we get this model N |ψ — wherein ψ is now true in the root, as
the length 2 path is now to a p node:
◦◦◦
•
•
◦
◦
◦
◦
•
•
◦
◦
•
•
◦
◦
•
•
◦
◦
•
The next iteration restores N : (N |ψ|ψ, s)↔(N, s). Again, we get:
N |ψn, s |= ψ for n ∈ N odd
N |ψn, s |= ¬ψ for n ∈ N even or n = 0
(N |ψn, s)↔(N |ψn+2, s) for all n ∈ N
This completes our example of a believable (01)ω-satisfiable formula for KD45. From this
example now directly follows Proposition 8 that there are believable σ-satisfiable formulas
on class KD45 for any string σ: this is similar to how we generalized the example of (01)ω-
satisfiability on K to a proof of σ-satisfiability on K for any σ ∈ {0, 1}ω, using the same
formula and the same model except for a different decoration of the variable p.
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6 Characterization of single-agent believable true lies
Exactly which formulas are true lies? Can they been characterized syntactically, and if
so, how? The corresponding problem for successful and self-refuting formulas has been
studied and solved for the single-agent case (Holliday and Icard, 2010). These character-
izations are given for S5 (see Section 4) but are said to hold also for KD45 “with minor
changes” (Holliday and Icard, 2010). The problem is still open for the multi-agent case,
for both classes of formulas. Two main reasons that the single-agent case is easier, are
that in that case, first, it is well known that any formula is (S5 or KD45) equivalent
to a formula in disjunctive normal form without any nestings of modalities, and, second,
that satisfiability of a formula in disjunctive normal form can be checked syntactically
(Holliday and Icard, 2010) (see below for details). Based on these two properties, the
characterizations in Holliday and Icard (2010) check that certain disjuncts (conditionally)
exist in the (disjunctive normal form) formula, which is shown to ensure that the formula
is of the required type.
In this section we give a similar characterization of believable true lies. It is heavily
inspired by Holliday and Icard (2010). Indeed, we take the technique directly from them, as
well as notation and concepts. Just as Holliday and Icard (2010) syntactically characterize
the set of successful formulas, we syntactically characterize the complement of the set
of believable true lies. The differences are in the details of the characterization and the
corresponding proof.
In the rest of this section, a “formula” always refers (single-agent) formula in the stan-
dard modal language. (Note that any formula in L is equivalent to such an announcement-
free formula.) We now formally define the two properties mentioned above, disjunctive
normal forms and syntactic satisfiability checking, and then give the characterization in
Definition 16.
Definition 14 (Disjunctive normal form) A formula ϕ is in disjunctive normal form
iff it is a disjunction of conjunctions of the form
δ = α ∧ ✷β1 ∧ . . . ∧ ✷βn ∧✸γ1 ∧ . . . ∧✸γm
where α and each γi are conjunctions of literals and each βi is a disjunction of literals. ⊣
We write ∼l to denote the negation of a literal l where double negations are removed.
Similarly, when β is a disjunction of literals, ∼β denotes the conjunction of negated literals
with single negation removed. For a given conjuction δ of the form above, in the following
we will write δα for α and δ✷✸ for ✷β1 ∧ . . . ∧ ✷βn ∧ ✸γ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ✸γm. Every formula is
KD45-equivalent to one in disjunctive normal form.
Definition 15 (Clarity (Holliday and Icard, 2010)) Given a conjunction or disjunc-
tion χ of literals, L(χ) denotes the set of literals occurring in it. Set L(χ) is open iff no
literal in L(χ) is the negation of any other. A conjunction δ = α∧✷β1∧ . . .∧✷βn∧✸γ1∧
. . .∧✸γm in disjunctive normal form is clear iff (i) L(α) is open; (ii) there is an open set of
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literals {l1, . . . , ln} with li ∈ L(βi); and (iii) for every γk there is a set of literals {l1, . . . , ln}
with li ∈ L(βi) such that {l1, . . . , ln} ∪ L(γk) is open. A disjunction in disjunctive normal
form is clear iff at least one of the disjuncts is clear. ⊣
The key point about clarity is that a formula isKD45-satisfiable iff it is clear (Holliday and Icard,
2010, Lemma 3.6).
We define a formula that we call a disjunctive lying form. We will then show that,
modulo logical equivalence, the class of these formulas corresponds exactly to the class of
formulas that are not believable true lies. The characterization will be explained after the
definition.
Definition 16 (Disjunctive lying form) A formula ϕ in disjunctive normal form is a
disjunctive lying form iff there exist (possibly empty) sets S and T of disjuncts of ϕ and a
conjunct ✷βθ of each θ ∈ T , such that any disjunctive normal form of
χ = ¬ϕ ∧✸ϕ ∧ χ1 ∧ χ2 ∧ χ3
is clear3 , where
χ1 =
∧
θ∈T
t(θ) ∧
∧
θ∈T
¬t(θ) t(θ) = θα ∧
∧
✸γ in θ
∨
σ∈S
✸(σα ∧ γ)
χ2 =
∧
σ∈S
σ✷✸ ∧
∧
σ∈S
¬σ✷✸
χ3 =
∧
θ∈T
∨
σ∈S
✸(σα ∧ ∼βθ)
and X denotes the set of disjuncts of ϕ that are not in X. ⊣
We now recall (page 11):
Proposition 11 A formula is a believable true lie iff it is not equivalent to a disjunctive
lying form.
Before we prove Proposition 11, let us explain the intuition behind the definition. This
will also serve as a guide to the proof of Proposition 11. If χ is true in some pointed model
(is clear), then ¬ϕ ∧ ✸ϕ is true. The role of χ1 − χ3 is to ensure that ¬ϕ remains false
in the updated model — which holds iff ϕ is not a believable true lie — by ensuring that
certain disjuncts (conditionally) exist in ϕ.
The role of S is to syntactically encode which states are still accessible from the current
state after the update. These are exactly the states where σα is true for some σ ∈ S. Since
3The definition allows both S and T to be empty. However, if S is empty then (any disjunctive form
of) χ is not clear (χ3 is a contradiction), so it follows that a disjunctive lying form actually must have a
non-empty S as a witness. If T is empty then χ3 is a tautology. There exist disjunctive lying forms with
an empty T as a witness (one example is p ∧✷p).
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ϕ is false in the initial pointed model, there is only one way it can become true in the
updated pointed model: if, for some disjunct θ of ϕ where θα is already true and all ✸γ
are already true and stay true in the updated model, all ✷β that were false in the initial
pointed model become true in the updated model. We must avoid that. Those disjuncts
that can potentially become true are exactly those in T . Thus, we must make sure that
for every disjunct θ ∈ T , there is at least one ✷β such that β is false in at least one state
that is still accessible after the update. That is ensured by χ3.
As an example, to see that the believable true lie p∨✷p (already in disjunctive normal
form) is not a disjunctive lying form, we need to check for all possible subsets of disjuncts
S and T over the set of all disjuncts {p,✷p}, whether χ is clear. There are only two
possibilities for T : T = ∅ or T = {✷p}. In the former case we get that χ1 = ¬p ∧ ⊥ (not
clear). In the latter case, there are four possibilities for S: if S = ∅ then χ3 = ⊥; if S = {p}
then χ3 = ✸(p ∧ ¬p); if S = {✷p} then χ2 = ✷p and χ3 = ✸¬p; and if S = {p,✷p} then
χ2 = ✷p and χ3 = ✸¬p ∧✸(p ∧ ¬p). In all cases χ is not clear.
As another example, consider p∧✷p which is not a believable true lie. To see that it is
a disjunctive lying form, take S = {p∧✷p} and T = ∅. We get that χ1 = ¬p, and χ2 = ✷p
and χ3 = ⊤. It is easy to see that χ is clear (it is equivalent to ¬p ∧ ✷p ∧✸(p ∧ ✷p)).
Proof (of Prop. 11) Without loss of generality, let ϕ be a disjunctive normal form.
Consider first the implication towards the left: assume that ϕ is a disjunctive lying form
and let S, T , χ and βθ for each θ ∈ T be as in Def. 16. We must show that there exists
M, s such that M, s |= ¬ϕ ∧ ✸ϕ and M |ϕ, s |= ¬ϕ. Since any disjunctive normal form of
χ is clear iff it is satisfiable, so let M, s be such that M, s |= χ. Then M, s |= ¬ϕ ∧ ✸ϕ.
Assume, towards a contradiction, that M |ϕ, s |= ϕ. Then there exists a disjunct θ in ϕ
such that M |ϕ, s |= θ. As explained above, we are going to show that χ3 ensures that
this is impossible. To do that, we must first show that it must be the case that θ ∈ T
(intuitively defined as the set of disjuncts that can potentially become true in the updated
model), and then that χ3 ensures that the conjunct ✷βθ is false in M |ϕ, s, leading to a
contradiction.
Thus, we first show that it must be the case that θ ∈ T . From M |ϕ, s |= θα it follows
thatM, s |= θα (θα is propositional). We now show that alsoM, s |=
∧
✸γ in θ
∨
σ∈S ✸(σ
α∧
γ), and it follows from M, s |= χ1 that θ ∈ T . Let ✸γ be a conjunct in θ. We have
that M |ϕ, s |= ✸γ, i.e., that there exists a state t such that Rst and M |ϕ, t |= γ and,
since t is a state in M |ϕ, M, t |= ϕ. From the latter it follows that M, t |= σ for some
disjunct σ of ϕ. From M, t |= σ✷✸ and Rst it follows that M, s |= σ✷✸ by standard KD45
reasoning, and thus that σ ∈ S by χ2. Since γ is propositional, M |ϕ, t |= γ implies that
M, t |= γ. Thus, M, s |= ✸(σα ∧ γ) for some σ ∈ S. Since ✸γ was arbitrary, we get that
M, s |=
∧
✸γ in θ
∨
σ∈S ✸(σ
α ∧ γ) and thus that θ ∈ T .
Having shown that θ ∈ T , we now get a contradiction from the fact that M, s |= χ3. It
follows that there exists a σ ∈ S such that M, s |= ✸(σα ∧ ∼βθ). That means that there
exists a state t such that Rst and M, t |= σα ∧ ∼βθ. From the fact that σ ∈ S we know
that M, s |= σ✷✸ and thus, by standard KD45 reasoning, that M, t |= σ✷✸. That means
that M, t |= σ and thus M, t |= ϕ. The latter means that t is accessible from s in M |ϕ,
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and thus that M |ϕ, s |= ¬✷βθ. But this contradicts M |ϕ, s |= ✷βθ which follows from the
assumption that M |ϕ, s |= θ. This concludes the implication towards the left.
For the direction towards the right, assume that ϕ is not a true lie, i.e., that there exist
M, s such that M, s |= ¬ϕ ∧✸ϕ and M |ϕ, s |= ¬ϕ. We now define T , S, and βθ for each
θ ∈ T , as follows. We will then show that the resulting χ is satisfiable. For any disjunct δ
in ϕ, let
δ ∈ T ⇔M, s |= t(δ) δ ∈ S ⇔M, s |= δ✷✸
Let θ ∈ T . In order to define βθ, we first show that for every conjunct ✸γ in θ, we have
that M |ϕ, s |= ✸γ. Let ✸γ be a conjunct in θ. From the fact that M, s |= t(θ) we get that
there is a σ ∈ S such thatM, s |= ✸(σα∧γ). In other words, there exists a state t such that
Rst andM, t |= σα∧γ. From χ2 and the fact that σ ∈ S and standard KD45 reasoning we
have that M, t |= σ✷✸. Thus, M, t |= σ. That means that M, t |= ϕ and that t is accessible
from s in M |ϕ, so M |ϕ, s |= ✸γ, for all ✸γ in θ. Since θα is propositional, M |ϕ, s |= θα
follows fromM, s |= t(θ), and thusM |ϕ, s |= ¬θ (which follows fromM |ϕ, s |= ¬ϕ) implies
that there must be a conjunct ✷β in θ such that M |ϕ, s |= ¬✷β. Let βθ be one such β.
Finally, we show that χ is satisfiable. It follows that any disjunctive normal form of
χ is clear, and thus that ϕ is a disjunctive lying form. We show that M, s |= χ (where
M, s is the pointed model above). We have that M, s |= ¬ϕ ∧ ✸ϕ by assumption, and
M, s |= χ1 ∧ χ2 by definition. It remains to be shown that M, s |= χ3. Let θ ∈ T . By
definition of βθ, M |ϕ, s |= ✸∼βθ. That means that there exists a state t such that t is
accessible from s in the updated model and M |ϕ, t |= ∼βθ. Since t is accessible from s in
M |ϕ, M, t |= ϕ. Let σ be a disjunct of ϕ such that M, t |= σ. Thus M, t |= σ✷✸, and from
that and standard KD45 reasoning, M, s |= σ✷✸, and thus σ ∈ S. FromM, t |= σ we know
that M, t |= σα, and since ∼βθ is propositional, M, t |= ∼βθ ∧ σ
α for some σ ∈ S and thus
M, s |= ✸(∼βθ ∧ σ
α). Since θ ∈ T was arbitrary, M, s |= χ3. 
7 Knowledge and iterated announcement whether
The focus of our story is on lying and therefore on the believed announcement logic, not on
the truthful announcement logic wherein lying is impossible. However some of our questions
are also meaningful in a logic of knowledge change, interpreted on models with equivalence
relations. As an example, let us address the matter of arbitrarily often iterated updates and
unstable formulas. For KD45 models we could affirmatively answer the following question
(Section 5.3):
Are there a model (M, s) and a formula ϕ, such that if we continue to announce
in this model that ϕ, the value of ϕ never stabilizes? (i)
This cannot be in S5, as ϕ cannot be truthfully announced when ϕ is false in the actual
state. An obvious question in the setting of S5 models and truthful public announcements
is:
Are there a model (M, s) and a formula ϕ, such that if we continue to announce
in this model whether ϕ, the value of ϕ never stabilizes? (ii)
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The (truthful public) announcement whether ϕ announces the value of ϕ. If ϕ is true, it
is a truthful announcement of ϕ, whereas if ϕ is false, it is a truthful announcement of
¬ϕ. To question (ii) we do not know the answer. We conjecture that the answer is: no.
However, a related question is:
Are there a model (M, s) and formulas ϕ and ψ, such that if we continue to
announce whether ϕ, the value of ψ never stabilizes? (iii)
This question we can answer positively, and we think that it may be found in various
epistemic scenarios of interest. In the scenario we present here, we do slightly better than
(iii):
Are there a model (M, s) and formulas ϕ and ψ, such that if we continue to
announce that ϕ, the value of ψ never stabilizes? (iv)
An answer to (iv) is also an answer to (iii).
Lack of stability in the sense of (iv) is more formally defined as follows. Let σ ∈ {0, 1}ω
be unstable; we recall that this means that for all n ∈ N there are m, k ≥ n such that
σm = 1 and σk = 0. Then we wish to find (M, s), ϕ, and ψ such that for all n ∈ N,
M |ϕn , s |= σn+1(ψ), and whereM is an S5 model. (Where we further recall that σn(ψ) = ψ
if σn = 1 and else σn(ψ) = ¬ψ; and that M |ϕ is the (S5 preserving) state elimination
semantics for truthful public announcement—see Section 2 and Appendix A.)
Now consider σ = (01)ω (σ = 010101...), the alternating string. Our solution is a simple
adjustment of the model N from Section 5.3 to realize an unstable formula for believed
announcement logic. The model below is the equivalence closure (reflexive, symmetric,
and transitive closure) of that model N . To achieve that visually, we only have to replace
the directed arrows involving the root and the node below the root by undirected links,
and assume transitivity. The alternating values of σi have been made explicit in three
branches, for an example. As in Section 5.3, we decorate the states of N with the variable
p according to σ; • means that p is false (σ1 = σ3 = 0), and ◦ that p is true (σ2 = 1).
◦••
◦
◦
•
•
•
•
◦
◦
•
•
◦
◦
•
•
◦
◦
•
•
σ1σ1
σ2
σ2
σ1
σ1
σ3
σ3
σ2
σ2
σ1
σ1
•
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In order to get N |ϕn , s |= σn+1(ψ) we decorate as before the model with values σn for the
propositional variable p (where the model above demonstrates strict alternation in the first
three values) and we take ϕ := ¬✸b(✷ap ∨ ✷a¬p) and ψ := ¬(✷bp ∨ ✷b¬p) → ✸a✸b✷ap.
In other words, we split the unstable formula ¬✸b(✷ap∨✷a¬p)∧ ((p∧✷b¬p)→ ✸a✸b✷ap)
that we employed in Section 5.3 into a part doing the job of always removing the leaf and
the node before the leaf of every branch, and another part checking whether there is a
branch of length two from the root to a p node, where the distinguishing formula for the
root has become b’s ignorance of p (there are now two nodes that can be the root).
For a different example of M |ϕn , s |= σn+1(ψ), consider an infinite number of (possibly)
muddy children, of which an infinite subset are in fact muddy, let ϕ be the usual proposition
‘nobody steps forward’ (nobody knows whether he or she is muddy; see Section 4), and
let ψ be the proposition ‘it is common knowledge that at least n children are muddy but
it is not common knowledge that at least n+ 1 children are muddy, where n is even’, and
let σ = (01)ω, again. After father’s initial announcement that at least one child is muddy
(which serves as the initial model N in this case), ψ is false (because n = 1 which is odd).
Whereas after nobody steps forward following the first request by father to do so if you
know whether you are muddy, ψ is true (because now it is common knowledge that at least
two children must be muddy: n = 2 which is even). And so on, ad infinitum.
If we consider non-public events, there are yet other interesting forms of unstable iter-
ation on S5 models. Running ahead of the next Section 8 (and see Appendix A): there are
action models such that their iterated execution does not stabilize on a given model. The
following is a vintage example in a two-agent setting.
Consider a two-state epistemic model for two agents Anne (solid access) and Bob
(dashed access) such that Anne is uncertain whether p but Bob knows whether p. Actu-
ally, p is true (the ◦ state, boxed). Iterated execution of the action model with two actions
with preconditions ¬✷ap and p ∧ ✷b¬✷ap transforms this two-state epistemic model into
a three-state model, and vice versa, ad infinitum. We could think of the formula ✷b¬✷ap
being alternatingly true and false in the p-world (the ◦-world) about which agent a is
uncertain. The execution can be visualized as follows.
◦ •
◦
×
◦
s t
◦
¬✷ap p ∧ ✷b¬✷ap
=
◦
◦ •
◦
◦ •
◦
×
◦
s t
◦
¬✷ap p ∧ ✷b¬✷ap
=
◦
◦ •
◦
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In the regrettably unpublished (Sadzik, 2006) the matter of stabilization after action model
execution is discussed at great length.
8 Private lies
True Lies and Butterflies
Mei wants to invite two friends Zhu Yingtai and Liang Shanbo to a party. She
knows that they are dying to get close to each other. Thus one will come if and
only if (s)he believes that the other will come. Obviously they do not yet wish
to admit this to each other, because as far as they know they are both still very
uncertain about each other’s feelings. Given this uncertainty, both in fact don’t
intend to come to the party. Mei now lies to Yingtai that Shanbo will come
to the party and she lies to Shanbo that Yingtai will come to the party. As a
result, they will both come to the party.
(This story is a free adaptation of the Butterfly Lovers, a famous Chinese
folktale, see https: // en. wikipedia. org/ wiki/ Butterfly_ Lovers .)
We can consider this an example of a true lie, because when Mei is telling to to Yingtai
that Shanbo plans to come, in fact Shanbo is not planning to come, and when she is telling
to Shanbo that Yingtai plans to come, in fact Yingtai is not (yet) planning to come. (For
modelling convenience we assume that Yingtai is slow in making up her mind after Mei
informs her about Shanbo.) After that, they both change their minds, and both lies have
become true.
In order to model this story we will depart in two respects from the previous setting
of believed announcement logic. In the first place these announcements are not public but
private. In the second place the agents that we model change their minds. As we consider
the factual propositions ‘Yingtai plans to go to the party’ and ‘Shanbo plans to go to the
party’, changing your mind involves factual change. A logic allowing both formalizations is
called action model logic (with factual change) (Baltag et al., 1998; van Ditmarsch et al.,
2007; van Benthem et al., 2006). This logic can be seen as a straightforward generaliza-
tion of believed announcement logic. (Alternatively, we can model the dynamics in more
protocol oriented dynamic epistemic logics, such as Wang (2010); van Ditmarsch et al.
(2014).) We only present some examples of action models and assume familiarity with the
framework. For technical details, see Appendix A on page 34 or the above references.
For an initial model, we assume that Yingtai and Shanbo know of themselves whether
they intend to go to the party but do not know it of the other one (and that this is known,
that this is the background knowledge). This comes with the following model, wherein solid
access represents the uncertainty of Yingtai and dashed access represents the uncertainty
of Shanbo, and where worlds are named with the facts py (‘Yingtai comes to the party’)
and ps (‘Shanbo comes to the party’) that are true there, where 01 stands for ‘py is false
and ps is true’, etc. The designated point of the model is boxed: initially both do not
intend to go to the party.
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00 10
01 11
Mei now lies to Yingtai, in private, that Shanbo goes to the party. For the convenience
of the reader informed about action model logic, we can model this as a three-pointed
action model as follows, on the left—where for convenience we have put the similar private
lie to Shanbo about Yingtai next to it, on the right.
¬ps ps
⊤
¬py py
⊤
The result of the first of these lying actions is as follows.
00 10
01 11
00 10
01 11
Now Mei lies privately to Shanbo that Yingtai goes to the party. The result of that
action is as follows. For the convenience of the reader we also depict (on the right) the
restriction of this model to the submodel generated by the point 00:
00 10
01 11
00 10
01 11
00 10
01 11
00 10
01 11
00 10
01
00 10
01 11
The above model formalizes that: Yingtai is not going to the party, believes that Shanbo
goes to the party, and believes that Shanbo is uncertain whether she goes to the party;
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and that: Shanbo is not going to the party, believes that Yingtai goes to the party, and
believes that Yingtai is uncertain whether he goes to the party.
We now first let Yingtai change her mind and then Shanbo change his mind. Yingtai
changing her mind can again be formalized as an action model, namely as a private as-
signment to Yingtai; and similarly, Shanbo changing his mind as a private assignment to
Shanbo. It is important here that a public assignment is an improper way to formalize this
action: a public assignment of Yingtai going to the party if she believes that Shanbo goes
to the party would be informative to Shanbo in case he were to believe that she believed
that he was going to the party. Because in case he was uncertain if she would go to the
party, he would then learn from this public assignment that she would come to the party
for his sake. Boring. Because exactly the absence of this sort of knowledge of the other’s
intentions makes first lovers’ meetings so thrilling. That kind of uncertainty should not be
resolved. Therefore, we formalize it as a private assignment. Interestingly, in the current
model the result of a public and of a private assignment (the result of Yingtai privately
changing her mind or publicly changing her mind) is the same. But that is because both
Yingtai and Shanbo believe that the other is uncertain whether they go to the party.
Below on the left is the action model for Yingtai changing her mind, and on the right,
the one for Shanbo changing his mind. (So, for example, according to our conventions,
in the left action model the solid relation, that of Yingtai, has identity access, and the
dashed relation, for Shanbo, has only a reflexive arrow in the point that the dashed arrow
is pointing to.)
py := ✷yps ⊤ ps := ✷spy ⊤
We now depict, from left to right, once more the model before they change their minds,
the model resulting from executing the action of Yingtai changing her mind, and the
model resulting from Shanbo changing his mind, where once again we restrict the actually
resulting models to the point-generated subframes.
00 10
01
00 10
01 11
Yingtai
⇒
10 10
11
00 10
01 11
Shanbo
⇒
11 11
11
00 10
01 11
Now that Yingtai and Shanbo have changed their minds, the lies have become the
truth! They both go the party, and they will both expect the other to be surprised to find
them at the party.4 They declare their love to each other and they live happily ever after.
4This is in accordance with the resulting model, above on the right; for example, in the root 11 of that
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9 What lies in the future?
We have modelled the true lie ϕ in believed announcement logic as the validity
¬ϕ→ [ϕ]ϕ
or as the satisfiability of
¬ϕ ∧ [ϕ]ϕ,
where the believed announcement models informative change and not factual change. Find-
ing satisfiable true lies, of which there are many, seems a first step towards finding valid
true lies, of which there are few. The latter seem to give more insight. They have the
shape of correctness statements ϕ → [α]ψ in Hoare logic; and indeed we have seen that
valid true lies come with strong syntactic restrictions. In the private lie example we also
modelled actions involving factual change. With this tool (and action model logic in its full
generality) in hand we can also formalize the Pang Juan and the Arnold Schwarzenegger
true lies, and make them fit a similar pattern. However, in this case we stop at satisfiability
and the mere description of the examples. We defer a more general treatment and generic
patterns involving validity to future research.
The Pang Juan true lie can be formalized as a two-pointed action model where one
action has precondition p, the other action has precondition ¬p, where the postcondition
is p := ⊤ in both actions (‘no matter what was the case, you will now die’), and where the
agent only considers the action with precondition p possible. The designated point is the
action where p is false (Pang Juan does not die). Let us call this action α(p).
¬p; p := ⊤ p; p := ⊤
Alternatively, we can separate the observation part from the ontic change part, and
consider the composition of those two actions. The former is then the lie that p, i.e., the
believed announcement that p when p is false. The action model equivalent of a believed
announcement is a two-point action model (see Appendix A). The latter a singleton action
called public assignment (namely of ⊤ to p). So we get:
¬p p composed with p := ⊤
As the observing agent is Pang Juan and the killing agent one of his opponents, one
may prefer the sequence of two epistemic actions over the single epistemic action. On
the other hand, as Pang Juan’s observation and his subsequent death seem inextricably
linked, one might prefer the single epistemic action. However, there is no notion of agency
in dynamic epistemic logics: the composition of two actions is indistinguishable from the
single action that combines the informative and ontic part: in the logic we have that [α(p)]ϕ
model Yingtai believes —move to the top 11— that Shanbo believes —move to 01 and 11— that Yingtai
is uncertain whether Shanbo comes to the party, both when she comes to the party —the equivalence class
consisting of 00 and 01— as when she does not come to the party —the cluster consisting of 10 and 11.
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is equivalent to [p][p := ⊤]ϕ, for all ϕ. So it does not matter. (We also recall that Pang
Juan would die no matter which observation he made. We can satisfy this requirement by
replacing the announcement that p by the announcement that q in the modelling with two
epistemic actions. But that does not give any insight.) We end up with the satisfiability
of
¬p ∧ [α(p)]p
but without being able to generalize this to a validity of shape ¬p→ [α(p)]p. This would
require stronger or different logics, involving agency, or other notions of action or interaction
(van Emde Boas and van Emde Boas Lubsen, 2016), or of self-fulfilling prophesy.
In the Arnold Schwarzenegger example there is a lot of belief change and factual change
going on. The epistemic goals of both agents, and their respective protocols in order to
reach those goals, seem to play an important part.
Let pj represent ‘Jamie Lee Curtis is a spy’ and pa represent ‘Arnold Schwarzenegger
is a spy’. At first Arnold is a spy (pa), Arnold believes that he is a spy (Bapa —of course,
the reader might say; but hang on!), Jamie believes he is not a spy (Bj¬pa), and Arnold’s
goal is to keep it that way (Bj¬pa). Jamie is not a spy (¬pj), she believes that she is not
a spy (Bj¬pj), and Arnold also believes this (Ba¬pj). Jamie’s goal also is to keep it that
way. So they both believe that the other is not a spy, and this is a stable situation, because
both want the other to believe that. We now get a number of transitions where beliefs,
facts, and goals all change. The initial situation is (i).
goal a goal j
(i) pa ¬pj Bapa Bj¬pa Ba¬pj Bj¬pj Bj¬pa Ba¬pj
(ii) pa ¬pj Bapa Bj¬pa Ba¬pj Bjpj Bj¬pa Bapj
(iii) pa ¬pj Bapa Bjpa Ba¬pj Bjpj Bj¬pa Bapj
(iv) pa pj Bapa Bjpa Bapj Bjpj Bjpa Bapj
The epistemic goals of the agents are only realized in (i) and (iv); only there they are
stable. Indeed, the last stage is the happy ending. (For details, please see the movie.) In
(ii), Jamie has started to enact a spy in order to make Arnold believe that she is a spy;
she even believes that she has become a spy, without realizing that she has been set up:
she is not really a spy. In (iii), she finds out that Arnold is a spy (because unlike Arnold,
third parties believe that she is a spy and that she is collaborating with Arnold). In (iv)
—abstracting from intervening details involving helicopter fights and Miami skyscrapers—
they end up collaborating as spies and believing in each other, now truthfully so. Again,
a stable situation.
Let us call the composition of all these actions α(pa, pj). Again we have satisfiability of
(pa ∧ ¬pj) ∧ [α(pa, pj)](pa ∧ pj)
but no general pattern involving validity of (pa ∧ ¬pj) → [α(pa, pj)](pa ∧ pj) or any other
additional insight. Lacking in our formal analysis in dynamic epistemic logic are much
stronger notions of epistemic protocol (how does one realize an epistemic goal given a
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belief state?), protocol logics, and, again, notions of agency (Bolander and Andersen, 2011;
Wang, 2010). Second-order false belief scenarios are modelled in Brau¨ner et al. (2016);
Arslan et al. (2015).
10 Conclusions
We have presented a large variety of communicative scenarios involving agents truthtelling
and lying while keeping their beliefs consistent. Of particular interest were iterations of an-
nouncements where the beliefs of the agents never stabilize: the models keep changing with
every next announcement. The investigation can be seen as the obvious next step given
existing in-depth investigations of successful and self-refuting updates changing agents’
knowledge, i.e., on models where epistemic stances are interpreted with equivalence rela-
tions. We have carried this forward not merely to the KD45 models for believing agents,
but also to models without structural properties. Two new types of update then come to
the fore: true lies (that become true after a lying announcement) and impossible lies (that
stay false even after a lying announcement), and also iterations of such announcements.
An open question on these iterations is which σ-valid formulas are realizable.
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Appendix A: Action models
Assume an epistemic model M = (S,R, V ), and a formula ϕ. We recall the semantics of
believed public announcement (arrow elimination semantics for public announcement).
M, s |= [ϕ]ψ iff M |ϕ, s |= ψ
where epistemic model M |ϕ = (S,Rϕ, V ) is as M except that for all a ∈ A, Rϕa :=
Ra ∩ (S × [[ϕ]]M ); and where [[ϕ]]M := {s ∈ S |M, s |= ϕ}.
The semantics of truthful public announcement (state elimination semantics for public
announcement) is as follows.
M, s |= [ϕ]ψ iff M, s |= ϕ implies M |ϕ, s |= ψ
where M |ϕ = (S
′, R′, V ′) is such that S ′ = [[ϕ]]M , R
′ = R ∩ ([[ϕ]]M × [[ϕ]]M ), and V
′ =
V ∩ [[ϕ]]M .
These different semantics are the same in the following important sense. If the an-
nouncement formula is true, the believed announcement semantics and truthful announce-
ment semantics result in bisimilar models. In other words, as bisimilar models have the
same logical theory: they cannot be distinguished by a formula in the logic, such as the
resulting beliefs of the agents.
Action model logic is a generalization of public announcement logic, namely to (possibly)
non-public actions. We present the version with factual change. In the language we only
have to replace the public announcement modalities [ϕ]ψ with action model modalities
[M, s]ψ, for ‘after execution of epistemic action (M, s), ψ’ (is true). An action model is like
an epistemic model, only instead of a valuation it has preconditions and postconditions.
The syntactic primitive [M, s]ψ may seem a peculiar mix of syntax and semantics, but
there is a way to see this as a properly inductive construct in a two-typed language with
both formulas and epistemic actions, because the preconditions and postconditions of these
actions are again formulas. We now proceed with the technical details.
An action model M = (S,R, pre, post) for language L (assumed to be simultaneously
defined with primitive construct [M, s]ϕ, see above) consists of a domain S of actions, an
accessibility function R : A → P(S × S), where each R(a), for which we write Ra, is an
accessibility relation, a precondition function pre : S → L, that assigns to each action its
executability precondition, and postcondition function post : S → P 6→ L, where it is
required that each post(s) only maps a finite (possibly empty) subset of all atoms to a
formula. For s ∈ S, (M, s) is an epistemic action.
The semantics of action model execution is as follows.
M, s |= [M, s]ψ iff M, s |= pre(s) implies M ⊗M, (s, s) |= ψ
where M ⊗M = (S ′, R′, V ′) (known as update of M with M, or as the result of executing M
in M) is such that S ′ = {(s, s) |M, s |= s}; ((s, s), (t, t)) ∈ Ra iff (s, t) ∈ Ra and (s, t) ∈ Ra;
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and (s, s) ∈ V ′(p) iff M, s |= post(s)(p) for all p in the domain of post, and otherwise
(s, s) ∈ V ′(p) iff s ∈ V (p).
A truthful public announcement of ϕ corresponds to a singleton action model M =
(S,R, pre, post) with S = {s}; Ra = {(s, s)} for all a ∈ A; pre(s) = ϕ (and empty domain for
postconditions). A believed public announcement of ϕ corresponds to a a two-point action
model M = (S,R, pre, post) with S = {s, t}; Ra = {(t, s), (s, s)} for all a ∈ A; pre(s) = ϕ and
pre(t) = ¬ϕ (and again the empty domain for postconditions). If the designated point is t
it is a public lie and if the designated point is s it is a truthful (believed) announcement.
Appendix B: Depicting knowledge and belief
To depict epistemic models, a pair of states in the accessibility relation is represented by an
arrow between those states. There are visual conventions to simplify the display of multi-
agent S5 models and multi-agent KD45 models. The conventions guarantee that, given a
number of agents, any of the following three uniquely determines the two others: (i) the
epistemic frame, (ii) the fully displayed visualization, and (iii) the simplified visualization.
In S5 models all accessibility relations are equivalence relations, so that we can partition
the domain in equivalence classes: sets of indistinguishable states. In the visualization we
can therefore assume transitive, symmetric, and reflexive closure. Visually, indistinguish-
able states are connected by a path (transitive closure) of undirected edges (symmetric
closure). Reflexive arrows not drawn (reflexive closure). Singleton equivalence classes do
not show in the visualation. But they are inferable as long as we know how many agents
there are.
Examples are as follows. The simplified visualization is on the right and the visualiza-
tion with all arrows of the accessibility relation is on the left.
• • • •
• • •
• • •
• • • • • •
In KD45 models all accessibility relations are transitive, euclidean and serial. Therefore
we can divide the domain in clusters. A cluster is a set of indistinguishable states (just as an
equivalence class in S5), but those states may also appear to be indistinguishable from the
perspective of states outside the cluster (unlike in S5), the so-called unreachable states. In
unreachable states beliefs are incorrect. In the KD45 visualization we can therefore assume
transitive and euclidean closure, and (this is crucial) we can assume reflexive closure of
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states in a cluster. This is because a state in a cluster is a state that is reachable from
another state. Reflexivity then follows from seriality and euclidicity: from (x, y) ∈ R and
once more) (x, y) ∈ R follows with euclidicity that (y, y) ∈ R). It is therefore not so
different from the S5 visualization. The only difference is that we also draw arrows from
states outside a cluster to a (exactly one) cluster. From the source state of such an arrow
is not only accessible the state in the cluster that is the endpoint of that arrow, but also
all other states in that cluster.
Examples are as follows.
• • • •
• • • • • •
• • • • • •
A good way to understand the visualization rules is to reproduce the full visualization
on the left from the simplified visualization on the right. The role of singleton clusters takes
some getting used to. For example, in the first KD45 example, on the right: As there is an
outgoing arrow from the left state, it is not a state in a cluster but an unreachable state.
Therefore it has no loop in the completion, on the left. As there is an incoming arrow
in the right state it is part of a cluster. This is therefore a singleton cluster. This state
must have a loop in the completion, on the left. In the last KD45 example, as there is an
outgoing arrow for the solid relation from the left state, it is, just as in the first example,
not a state in a cluster but an unreachable state. However, as there there is no outgoing
arrow for the dashed relation from the left state, we can infer that it is a singleton cluster
and thus infer a loop for the dashed relation. And indeed, on the left, it is there. Etc.
The S5 visualization is well-known. The KD45 visualization is not well-known.
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